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The Economic Costs and Benefits of Implementing the Clean Power Plan
Summary
This brief looks at the costs of implementing the EPA’s Clean Power Plan. Specifically, it examines whether
implementing the CPP on a state-by-state basis—that is, with each state meeting its own individual target for
emissions reduction by 2030, rather than establishing regional targets—is economically efficient. The
economic analysis uses data from electricity-generating firms participating in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) Interconnection to examine the relative economic efficiency of regional versus state-by-state
implementation of the CPP. The research indicates that state-by-state implementation would yield the lowest
electricity prices in 2030.
Keywords
energy policy, EPA, Clean Power Plan, cost efficiency, emissions, carbon, natural gas, electricity, CO2, best
available technology, BAT
Disciplines
Energy Policy | Environmental Studies | Infrastructure | Other Economics | Public Economics | Public Policy
| Regional Economics
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License






The Economic Costs and Benefits 
of Implementing the Clean  
Power Plan
Jose Miguel Abito, PhD 
Christopher R. Knittel, PhD 
Konstantinos Metaxoglou, PhD 
Andre Trindade, PhD
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) is the crowning environmental achievement of the 
Obama presidency, but a stay of proceedings has prevented the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) from enforcing the rule’s implementation since early 2016.
In February, the Supreme Court suspended the 
authority granted to the EPA under the Clean Air Act 
to compel states’ preliminary CPP compliance. This 
action grants courts the necessary time to resolve legal 
challenges related to the new rule before any early-
stage EPA enforcement efforts could de facto nullify 
a negative judgment against CPP implementation, 
which could be handed down in the coming months.1 
Presuming the EPA eventually will be able to move 
forward with the CPP—which is not guaranteed 
given the unprecedented scope of regulatory authority 
the agency is assuming—the conversation about the 
plan will return to the question of economic viability. 
In short, what will be the CPP’s effect on long-term 
energy prices in the United States?
Although the federal government is seeking to 
address carbon pollution from power plants by setting 
a national goal for reduced CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel-fired and natural gas-fired plants, each state must 
meet its own individual target for emissions reduction 
by 2030, with interim requirements each year between 
2022-2029. On the surface, the absence of a single, 
national CO2 market for trading emission allowances 
would suggest that implementing the CPP on a state-
by-state basis would lead to inefficiencies in curbing 
SUMMARY
• This brief looks at the costs of implementing the EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan. Specifically, it examines whether implementing 
the CPP on a state-by-state basis—that is, with each state 
meeting its own individual target for emissions reduction by 
2030, rather than establishing regional targets—is economi-
cally efficient. The answer is yes.
• The economic analysis uses data from electricity-generating 
firms participating in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
(PJM) Interconnection to examine the relative economic ef-
ficiency of regional versus state-by-state implementation of 
the CPP.
• Looking at natural gas capacity across regional and state-
by-state implementations in 2030, the research shows that 
capacity in the state-by-state scenario (70 GW) is about 24% 
higher than the capacity in the regional scenario (56 GW). This 
translates to reduced CO2 prices in 2030--$27/ton (regional) 
and $15/ton (state-by-state).
• The key mechanism is investment. Compared to the regional 
scenario, implementing the CPP on a state-by-state basis leads 
to higher initial CO2 prices. But those higher prices increase 
incentives to invest aggressively in new natural gas capacity, 
using the best available technology in terms of emissions 
and efficiency. This, in turn, leads to an overall decrease in 
wholesale electricity prices—in fact, the research indicates 
that state-by-state implementation would yield the lowest 
electricity prices in 2030.
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emissions (and it definitely leads 
to higher initial CO2 prices), thus 
increasing the economic cost of the 
CPP. But we offer two considerations. 
First, the existence of a single market 
for wholesale electricity mitigates the 
potential negative effects of separate 
state-level CO2 markets. Individual 
firms will make optimal new power 
plant investment decisions based on 
the distribution of production and 
CO2 prices across state markets, 
implicitly coordinating them in the 
process. Second, we simulate a model 
that shows that electricity prices 
can actually be lower by 2030 when 
implementation occurs state-by-state 
instead of regionally.
The model takes advantage of rich 
energy production data from electric-
ity-generating firms participating in 
the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Mary-
land (PJM) Interconnection, which 
operates the country’s largest whole-
sale electricity market as the regional 
transmission organization (RTO) for 
13 states across 20 zones.2 By utiliz-
ing PJM as an example of a viable 
cohort of states that, under the new 
rule, could aggregate their individual 
emission targets and implement the 
CPP at a regional-level, we examined 
the relative economic efficiency of 
regional versus state-by-state imple-
mentation. Our preliminary findings 
were remarkable. By 2022—the first 
year of interim benchmarks—regional 
implementation leads to electricity 
prices of 5.7 cents/kWh, while state-
by-state implementation results in 
prices of 8.6 cents/kWh. However, by 
2030, electricity prices are 5.8 cents/
kWh regionally versus 4.6 cents/kWh 
in a state-by-state scenario. This Issue 
Brief highlights how investment, in 
implicitly coordinating separate state 
CO2 markets, is the main mechanism 
for our findings.3
BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2015, the EPA 
published the Clean Power Plan 
Final Rule in the Federal Register 
after receiving and incorporating 4.3 
million comments on the original 
proposed rule.4 The CPP, though a 
federal plan, establishes state-level 
targets for cutting carbon emissions 
from the nation’s largest polluter—
power plants.5 When aggregated, the 
individual state targets add up to the 
national goal: a 32 percent reduction 
in carbon pollution below 2005 levels 
by 2030 (see Figure 1). According 
to the EPA, the CPP has expected 
climate benefits of $20 billion and 
health benefits in the range of $14-
$34 billion. The rule would facilitate 
the transition to cleaner, natural gas 
energy, promote investment in alter-
native energy technologies, and pro-
vide states the flexibility to meet their 
emissions-cutting goals. Ultimately, 
the EPA’s chief concern is the federal 
32 percent target that, if met, would 
constitute an important milestone 
in the fight against anthropogenic 
climate change.
If the stay of proceedings is lifted, 
the EPA will oblige states to submit 
unique Implementation Plans for 
ensuring that existing power plants 
within their jurisdictions achieve both 
interim and final CO2 targets. The 
rule offers three options for measur-
ing progress and it highlights three 
so-called building blocks for meeting 
CCP targets based on the best system 
of emission reductions (BSER) avail-
able for CO2 emitting power plants 
(see Table 1). It also allows (but does 
not require) states to partner with 
other states when implementing  
their plans. 
The state targets do not apply to 
new, modified, or reconstructed plants, 
which the EPA instead will regulate 
through standards and emissions limi-
tations that are source- or unit-spe-
cific. For example, the final rule speci-
fies a natural gas plant limit of 1000 
 1  Some legal experts have suggested that the stay was grant-
ed to avoid an outcome similar to Michigan vs. EPA. In that 
case from 2015, preliminary clean air compliance measures 
– mandated by the EPA – cost states nearly $10 billion in 
exchange for only $4 million in direct health benefits before 
the Supreme Court ruled that the agency unreasonably 
interpreted the Clean Air Act. The Court decided that the EPA 
does need to consider costs when it implements regulations. 
For more, see Jonathan H. Adler, “Supreme Court puts the 
brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan”, The Washington 
Post, February 9, 2016.
 2  These thirteen states are Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Washington, D.C. There are nearly 1,000 electricity-
generating firms that buy, sell, and deliver electricity through 
PJM’s spot wholesale market, including ten strategic firms 
that participate in the lion’s share of all exchanges and invest 
in all of the fuel-specific new capacity.
 3  The primary source for this Issue Brief is our working paper: 
Jose Miguel Abito, Christopher R. Knittel, Konstantinos 
Metaxoglou, and Andre Trindade (2016), “Separate Markets 
for Externalities: Regional versus State-by-State Implemen-
tation of the Clean Power Plan”.
 4  Technically, the CPP refers both to a set of emissions targets 
applied to existing power plants (pursuant to Section 111(d) 
of the Clean Air Act) and to rules that are applicable to new 
energy sources as part of the “Carbon Pollution Standard for 
New Plants” (pursuant to Section 111(b) of the CAA). The 
final rule is available here: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
NOTES
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lbs of CO2 per MWh, below which 
firms will not have to pay for what 
they emit. In essence, this requires 
them to invest in the latest combined 
cycle technology. For coal-fired plants, 
the limit is 1400 lbs of CO2 per 
MWh, which is currently achievable 
only with carbon capture and storage 
technology—a technology that is in 
its infancy and presently cannot meet 
the new standards. The EPA cannot 
require energy producing firms to use 
explicit technologies, but even the best 
new coal-fired plants cannot meet 
the new emission limits by design. 
Some existing natural gas-fired power 
plants, however, do meet these new 
standards, leading to a policy question 
that remains unresolved, at least from 
the perspective of energy producers 
(see Policy Implications below). 
IMPLEMENTATION 
SCENARIOS IN THE PJM VS. 
STATE-LEVEL MODEL
Policymakers generally have sup-
ported market-based mechanisms 
for addressing environmental exter-
nalities, such as carbon pollution, but 
the problem of coordinating various 
jurisdictions can quickly hamper 
implementation. Achieving state-level 
emissions goals under the CPP will 
require efficient implementation of 
one or more of the building blocks, as 
well as robust emissions trading, likely 
in the form of emission allowances, 
via (we assume) a perfectly competi-
tive CO2 permit market. Inefficient 
implementation could significantly 
raise energy prices, which neither 
consumers nor policymakers want. 
Mitigating potential inefficiencies 
caused by state-by-state implementa-
tion of the CPP therefore depends on 
the ability of firms to reallocate elec-
tricity production across states. This 
is a complex challenge. States do not 
have unlimited capacity for generating 
electricity, and there are many firms 
striving to make optimal production 
and investment decisions in each state. 
These capacity limitations prevent 
existing plant output from being freely 
reallocated across states. However, 
output coming from new capacity 
investments can be located based on 
CO2 prices across states.6
We sought to discover what would 
happen to CO2 prices, wholesale 
electricity prices, and investment in 
new capacity under a number of dif-
ferent scenarios, so we constructed 
and estimated a model of electricity 
generation and investment for firms 
FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf 
 5  According to the EPA, fossil fuel-fired power plants are the 
largest source of U.S. CO2 emissions, accounting for 31 
percent of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which 
itself is the largest source of pollution (82 percent) in the 
country.
 6  All else equal, the CO2 price alters the merit order of plants 
with different fuel types (coal vs. natural gas), heat and 
emission rates, and it increases generating cost. Currently, 
since no emissions trading is occurring, the CO2 prices in 
question are shadow prices, or unofficial firm estimates of 
likely CO2 spot market prices.
 7  Data sources include EPA, PJM, EIA, FERC, SNL Energy, 
Evolution Markets, and other proprietary data. See Abito et 
al. (2016) for more information.
 8  An argument for this assumption can be found here: 
Bushnell, J., S. Holland, J. Hughes, and C. Knittel (2015), 
“Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan”, NBER Working Paper 21259.
 9  Electricity prices rose substantially in the fourth scenario 
where no new investment was allowed under a regional 
implementation.
NOTES 
TABLE 1:  CPP EMPHASIS ON FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING STATEWIDE EMISSIONS 
GOALS 
 
Measurement Options for Interim and Final Targets (states choose one):
Option 1 - a rate-based state goal measured in pounds per megawatt hour (lb/MWh)
Option 2 - a mass-based state goal measured in total short tons of CO2
Option 3 - a mass-based state goal with a new source complement measured in total short tons of CO2
Strategies for Reducing Emissions (states can use in any combination):
Building Block 1 - reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation by improving the heat rate of existing coal-fired 
power plants
Building Block 2 - substituting increased electricity generation from lower-emitting existing natural gas plants for reduced 
generation from higher-emitting coal-fired power plants
Building Block 3 - substituting increased electricity generation from new zero-emitting renewable energy sources (like wind 
and solar) for reduced generation from existing coal-fired power plants
Source: Environmental Protection Agency
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participating in the PJM wholesale 
market. We assume that all new 
investment will be in the current best 
available technology (BAT) for coal 
and natural gas plants, both because 
the CPP mandates this and because 
such an investment maximizes firm 
profit. The scenarios are as follows:
1. Baseline: Business-as-usual with-
out CPP targets (e.g., courts rule 
against the EPA and prohibit CPP 
implementation).
2. Regional Implementation: One 
PJM-wide carbon market and 
CO2 price to achieve a regional 
target.
3. State-by-State Implementation: 
State-based carbon markets and 
CO2 prices to achieve CPP state-
level targets. Under this scenario, 
states cannot trade allowances with 
other states, even within the same 
firm. All state markets are linked 
via the PJM wholesale market for 
electricity, and all markets must 
clear simultaneously.
4. Regional Implementation ex-
Investment: One PJM-wide carbon 
market and CO2 price in an 
environment with no new invest-
ment (assumes coal- and gas-fired 
capacity at 2012 levels).
A final note on the model: The 
CPP affects supply and investment 
decisions (and firm profits) by increas-
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from fossil fuels and changing the 
relative prices of coal and natural gas. 
To accurately capture the CPP’s effect 
on firms’ decision-making, we needed 
to have a rich model of firms’ costs 
and how these costs evolve as they add 
new capacity. Since firms have differ-
ent portfolios of plants, with different 
efficiency levels, different fuel types, 
and different capacities, our model 
uses all available data on heat rates, 
emission rates and operating and 
maintenance costs, thus preserving the 
diversity inherent in the industry.7
RESULTS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
The target CO2 emission rates in the 
CPP final rule are either mass-based 
(total CO2 short tons) or rate-based 
(lbs/MWh). We assume that all states 
choose mass-based targets.8 Imple-
mentation begins gradually and CO2 
emissions decrease each year until 
2030, after which time we assume 
emissions remain constant. Even 
without the CPP, the model predicts 
that firms will invest only in new 
natural gas capacity and not in coal. 
If there is no CPP in 2030, natu-
ral gas capacity is just 33 GW, as gen-
eration from coal steadily increases 
while electricity demand increases 
despite no new investment in coal 
capacity. Once firms face a positive 
CO2 price, generation from coal falls 
sharply, especially in the state-by-
state scenario.
If the CPP is implemented, 
its effects are significantly differ-
ent, depending on whether there 
is regional or state-by-state imple-
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capacity across regional and state-
by-state implementations in 2030, 
capacity in the latter (70 GW) is 
about 24% higher than the capac-
ity in the former (56 GW). In terms 
of 2030 CO2 prices, this translates 
to $27/ton (regional) and $15/ton 
(state-by-state). As noted earlier, the 
initial CO2 price is higher under the 
scenario of state-by-state implemen-
tation. This increases the incentives 
to invest in new natural gas capac-
ity, which reflects the best available 
technology in terms of emissions 
and efficiency. High CO2 prices 
encourage firms to invest much more 
aggressively in order to retire old, 
inefficient capacity from the merit 
order, leading to an overall decrease in 
wholesale electricity prices (see Figure 
2). Remarkably, electricity prices are 
even lower with the state-by-state 
implementation compared to the 
regional scenario by 2030. As noted 
in the opening of this brief, by 2030, 
electricity prices are 5.8 cents/kWh 
regionally versus 4.6 cents/kWh in a 
state-by-state scenario.9 
With regional implementation, 
BAT capacity accounts for 31% of 
total generation by 2030. In con-
trast, 45% of generation comes from 
BAT capacity under state-by-state 
implementation. Without CPP, BAT 
capacity accounts for less than 6% of 
total generation.
Considering the expected public 
health and environmental benefits 
garnered by a shift towards new BAT 
capacity, and noting that the lowest 
electricity prices in 2030 come as a 
result of state-by-state implementa-
tion, there is reason to believe the 
Clean Power Plan is economically 
beneficial. However, some questions 
remain. For instance, there is an ongo-
ing debate about whether the loca-
tion of new BAT capacity matters, as 
different sections of the Clean Air Act 
offer conflicting answers. But the pri-
mary concern is that existing natural 
gas plants that meet the new emis-
sions standards, even if they do not 
represent BAT, may be facing artificial 
costs under the CPP. This (significant) 
subset of “old” yet standard-meeting 
plants must pay for emissions, accord-
ing to the final rule, while new plants 
will not have to pay for emissions, as 
they only have to ensure they emit less 
than the new limit. The resolutions to 
these questions could still dramatically 
alter the final landscape.
CONCLUSION
If the stay on the CPP is lifted and 
policymakers refocus their atten-
tion on the cost of implementing the 
new rule, our research indicates that 
state-by-state implementation would 
not be a bad alternative to regional 
implementation (e.g., a cohort of 
PJM Interconnection states) in terms 
of wholesale electricity prices (and 
therefore CO2 prices in a competi-
tive permit market) and new capac-
ity investment. Because investment 
implicitly coordinates separate state 
CO2 markets, it is the key to evaluat-
ing CPP implementation. Our results 
on new BAT investment under the 
four implementation scenarios speak 
for themselves.
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